TB 1-1520-238-20-117
NOTE
AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM HOME BASE MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO A CIRCLED
RED "X" FOR A ONE--TIME DIRECT FLIGHT, NOT TO EXCEED 5 HOURS, TO THE
NEAREST MILITARY BASE WITH ADEQUATE SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE
CAPABILITIES. AIRCRAFT GROUND RUN--UPS WITH ROTORS TURNING ARE
NOT AUTHORIZED.
b. Aircraft in Maintenance. Same as para 1a.
c.
Aircraft in Transit. Same as para 1a.
d. Maintenance Trainers (Category A and B). Same as para 1a.
e. Component/Parts in Stock at All Levels (Depot and Others) Including War Reserves. Upon receipt
of this TB, depot and materiel activity commanders will ensure the materiel condition tags of all items in all
condition codes listed in paragraphs 6 and 7 are annotated to read: "SOF AH--64--01--04 (TB
1--1520--238--20--117), Inspection of Tail Rotor Blades, not complied with."
(1) Wholesale Stock. Upon receipt of this TB, depot and materiel activity commanders will en-
sure all items in condition codes "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E", listed in paragraphs 6 and 7, are placed in condition
code "J" and tagged with a suspended tag/label -- Materiel, DD Form 1575/DD Form 1575--1. Do not remove
original condition tags. Report compliance with this TB IAW paragraph 14b(2) not later than 19 June 2001.
(2) Retail Stock. Upon receipt of this TB, commanders and facility managers maintaining retail
stock at installation level and below shall contact the supported aviation unit to perform the procedures re-
quired IAW paragraphs 8 and 9 on suspect materiel. Dispose of discrepant materiel IAW paragraph 10. Re-
port compliance with this TB IAW paragraph 14c(2) not later than 19 June 2001.
f. Components/Parts in Work (Depot Level and Others). Depot and other maintenance activity com-
manders will ensure items listed in paragraphs 6 and 7 are not issued until they are in compliance with this
TB.
2. Task/Inspection Suspense Date. Complete the inspection IAW paragraphs 8 and 9 prior to next flight
but not later than 18 June 2001 and report IAW para 14a(2) not later than 19 June 2001.
2001.
4.
Summary of the Problem.
a. An AH--64A was involved in an incident where the tail rotor head assembly separated from the air-
craft in flight. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of this incident. Preliminary investigation
has revealed separation may have been caused by a tail rotor blade failure in flight. As a temporary measure,
an interim tail rotor blade life limit has been established.
b. For manpower/downtime and funding impacts, see paragraph 12.
c.
The purpose of this TB is to:
(1) Require inspection of all AH--64 series aircraft to determine time since new (TSN) of all tail
rotor blades.
(2) Establish a temporary life limit for the tail rotor blades of 1000 hours TSN.
5.
End Items To Be Inspected.
All AH--64 series aircraft.
Assembly Components To Be Inspected. N/A.
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